Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Transport Leasing Company v. Reliance Insurance
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul R. Howell; Clark B. Fetzer; David L. Hughes; Howell, Fetzer & Hughes; Attorneys for
Respondents.
Calvin L. Rampton; Larry A. Steele; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for
Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Transport Leasing Company v. Reliance Insurance Company, No. 880235.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2178

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KF'J
50
,A10
DOCKET NO
IN M E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
a Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana
corporation qualified to do
business in the State of Utah,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

88-u235-*i4

Defendant and Respondent.
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

No. 870359
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, a
Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana
corporation qualified to do
business in the State of Utah,
Defendants and Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
District Judge
Paul R. Howell
Clark B. Fetzer
David L. Hughes
HOWELL, FETZER & HUGHES
Attorneys for Respondent
700 Continental Bank Building
200 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Calvin L. Rampton
Larry A. Steele
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Appellants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

J AN 2 Y V333
O

kitk, Supreme Court, Ufa!

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY,
a Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana
corporation qualified to do
business in the State of Utah,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

No. 870359
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs
TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY, a
Montana partnership, and
TRANSYSTEMS, INC., a Montana
corporation qualified to do
business in the State of Utah,
Defendants and Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
District Judge
Paul R. Howell
Clark B. Fetzer
David L. Hughes
HOWELL, FETZER & HUGHES
Attorneys for Respondent
700 Continental Bank Building
200 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Calvin L. Rampton
Larry A. Steele
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Appellants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE FRANK Ge NOEL
District Judge
Paul R. Howell
Clark B, Fetzer
David L. Hughes
HOWELL, FETZER & HUGHES
Attorneys for Respondent
700 Continental Bank Building
200 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Calvin L. Rampton
Larry A. Steele
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Appellants
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John Preston Creer
Attorney for LoAo Young Sons
Construction Company
36 South State Street
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

All parties to the proceeding in the court below are
included in the caption of the case except for L.A, Young Sons
Construction Company, which is a party in the court below but
against whom no relief is sought in this appealc

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Statement of Jurisdiction
Statement of Issues Presented for Review

....

2

. . . . . . . .

2

Statement of Constitutional Provisions, Statutes,
Ordinances, Rules and Regulations Determinative
of the Case

.

3

Statement of the Case

.

4

Summary of Arguments

. . . . . . . . . .

Argument
I.

II.

9
11

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CLAIMS FOR
REPAIRS TO THE TRUCK OWNER'S EQUIPMENT ARE
NOT COVERED BY THE PAYMENT BOND
A CONTRACT OF A SURETY IS STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AGAINST SURETY

15

A SURETY IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE WHEN
DAMAGES CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE MAKE
UP PART OF THE RENT

16

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ESCROW
FUNDS BELONGED TO THE SURETY BY RIGHT OF
SUBROGATION
PLAINTIFFS NEED NOT RESORT TO THE ESCROW
PRIOR TO SEEKING PAYMENT FROM
RELIANCE

Conclusion

11

17

19
22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases Cited
Featherstone v. Emerson, 45 P.713 (Utah 1896) . . . .

20

Moran Towing Corp, v. M. A, Gammino Construction
Co, , 363 F.2d 108 . . .
• . -13, 14, 15
National Surety Co, v. Salt Lake County, 5 F.2d
34 (8th Cir„ 1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Company, 371 U.So
132 9 L. Ed. 190 • • • . . . . . . . • . . . . . .

17

Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co,, 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) . . . . . . . .
Tolton v. Maryland Company, 293 P.611

18

. . . . . . .

United States v. Kelly, 192 F. Supp. 274
(Ark. 1961)

12, 15

. .

15

.

3

Statutes Cited
Utah Code Ann., § 14-1-13
Authorities Cited
Laws of Utah, 1987

3

Restatement of Security .

20

Rule 54B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety 334

. . . . . . . . .

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(a)

-ii-

2

....

19
2

STATEMENT Or JURlSbi.CT1G&!

Th i s appe a 1 I s t a ken. pu r si 1 a nt: t o t he p r o v i s i o ns o f
Rule 3 ( a ) , "U'tah Rules of Appellate procedure, from two orders
of summary judgment entered in the court below.
. r . r.i- • - .- .
second d*.. '*:,..*

-itered

" :i day of March, ] 987, and the

*- . *

i^J

September

The first of

• ^ ^ e j on the ] 5th day of

final order was certified by the court
-. ,

provi s:i ons c:

i i *~ s: dh K O I H > ^r •. —*n ;. P r o c e d u r e .

Kuie b4B

STATEMENT Of ISSUES P R E S E N T E D BUR REVIEW
T h e r e a r e t w o issues presented for review in this c a s e ,
1. • Did the court err :i n ; ^ M n q that the cl aims of

L.A. Young Sons Construction Company,, were not covered by the
payment bond furnished by the defendant, Reliance Insurance
Company? .
Die1 ' '

2.

'

_

' •" elding that funds i n an

e s c r n w a r m ,r 1 ->^<* . - -)v HI r 'jr^em^nt between

th

-- plaintiff
•

t "IP defendai

T

Reliance

insuioaee

-2-

company/

STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE CASE,
The following constitutional provisions, statutes,
regulations, rules, and ordinances whose interpretation will
determine the deposition of the case are as follows:
BOND STATUTE
14-1-13.

Performance and payment bonds on public
projects - Conditions and terms.

(1) Before any contract for the construction,
alteration or repair of any public building, public work or
public improvement of the state or its political subdivisions
is awarded to any person, that person shall furnish to the
appropriate political entity the following bonds:
(b) a payment bond in an amount equal to 100% of
the price specified in the contract, solely for the
protection of persons supplying labor or materials to
the contractor or his subcontractors for the
performance of work provided for in the contract.
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds.
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to
the contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in the
contract for which a payment bond is furnished under this
chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days from the
date on which the last of the* labor was performed or material
was supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond
for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue
on he contract for the amount due.*

*These statutes were repealed by Senate Bill 183,
Chapter 218, Laws of Utah, 1987. However, such act did not
become effective until April 27, 1987; thus, the above section
covered this contract. They were replaced by § 63-56-38, Utah
Code Ann. (1953) as enacted by Chapter 218, Laws of Utah,
1987. Provisions of 63-56-38, however, so far as these
particular provisions are concerned, is the same as the above
quoted statute and so it would be immaterial as to which was
applicable.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L.A. Young Sons Construction Company (a general
contractor hereinafter called "Contractor") entered into a
contract with the State of Utah to construct a portion of
Highway 1-80 near the southern end of the Great Salt Lakec

The

defendant, Reliance Insurance Company, (hereinafter called
"Surety") provided performance and payment bonds covering the
contract.

The Contractor leased certain heavy moving equipment

from Transport Leasing Company and Transystems, Inc.
(hereinafter called the "Truck Owner").

The lease agreement is

attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A".

The equipment,

consisting of trucks and belly dump type trailers, was to be
used by the Contractor for moving fill material from an old
smelter slag dump to the job site.

The Contractor was to

provide fuel for the trucks, labor for the driving of the
trucks, and all services required in the operation of the
trucks and the loading, weighing, and unloading of the trucks.
The only personnel provided by the Truck Owners were two
supervisors to look after the condition of the trucks.
The leasing agreement provided that the State should
issue separate checks covering the billings of the Truck Owner
for services rendered under the contract, such checks to show
the Contractor and the Truck Owner as joint payees.
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At the

time of the making of the second advance payment on the joint
payee arrangement, the Contractor disputed the amount billed by
the Truck Owner, both for rental and for repairs.

Thereupon,

the Truck Owner and the Contractor, by a joint document,
created an escrow account with Continental Bank and Trust
Company in Salt Lake City.

That portion of the Truck Owner's

bill which was not disputed by the Contractor was paid to the
Truck Owner.

The balance of the amount in the joint payee

check went into the escrow account to be paid out on the joint
order of the Truck Owner and the Contractor or on the order of
a court of competent jurisdiction.

Some subsequent payments

were likewise paid partially to the Truck Owner and partially
into the escrow account.

On later payments on the job, the

Contractor refused to conform to the joint payee arrangements
and received one-party checks from the State of Utah and in
turn paid the Truck Owner what the Contractor thought was due.
At the completion of the job, the Truck Owner claimed
that the Contractor owed it $53,276.00 for rental on the
equipment and $149,855.61 for extraordinary repairs on the
equipment over and above expected depreciation.

At the time of

the filing of the action, there was in the escrow account,
including interest, $61,214.13.

The account has continued to

accumulate interest since the filing of the complaint.
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The

case has proceeded to this point on the basis of three summary
judgments.
1.

A summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff

granting judgment against both the Contractor and Surety for
unpaid truck rental payments in the sum of $53,423.37.
2.

A summary judgment in favor of Reliance to the

effect that the Surety's payment bond did not cover
extraordinary repairs on plaintiff's equipment notwithstanding
the terms of the equipment rental agreement*
3.

A summary judgment in favor of Reliance to the

effect that Reliance was the owner of the funds in the escrow
by right of subrogation.
The paragraph of the equipment leasing agreement
covering extraordinary damage to the truck reads as follows:
In the event any of the leased equipment
shall be damaged through the negligence of
the Lessee or the Lessee's employees, the
Lessee shall be responsible for the repair
of such damage. The Lessee shall have the
responsibility of maintaining the roads over
which the leased equipment will be operated
in a suitable condition so that unreasonable
or excessive wear and tear to the leased
units shall not result from the operation.
Although the facts surrounding the activities
resulting in extraordinary damage to the trucks and trailers
are in dispute, as this judgment was given as a summary
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judgment/ we will hereinafter make reference to the plaintiffs'
evidence in this regard as establishing the facts for these
proceedings/ notwithstanding the fact that the defendants
contest many of these factual matters.

It is axiomatic that in

considering a motion for summary judgment/ disputed issues of
fact shall/ if supported by competent evidence, be resolved
against the party moving for summary judgment.

Also, all

reasonable inferences shall be drawn in favor of the party
resisting.
The equipment furnished by the plaintiff was in good
repair and was suitable for the job contemplated, had the
Contractor conformed to ordinary practices in the* industry and
to procedures which the Contractor had represented to the Truck
Owner would be followed.

The Contractor, however, not long

into the job, abandoned the agreed-upon and normally followed
procedures and engaged in certain practices which cut the
Contractor's cost but resulted in extensive damage to the Truck
Owner's equipment.

The activities engaged in by the Contractor

are as follows:
1.

It had been agreed that the Contractor would

screen the slag material being loaded so that material loaded
on the Truck Owner's equipment would not exceed 12 inches in
diameter.

The screening procedure, however, slowed down the
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loading and hauling process so the Contractor abandoned the
screening and loaded the slag material out of the slag dumps
directly onto the Truck Owner's equipment.

Chunks of slag as

large as four feet long and weighing as much as 6,000 pounds
were loaded into the Truck Owner's trailers, extensively
damaging the trailers' bodies during loading and tearing out
the dump control equipment as the slag was unloaded through the
belly dumps.

(See depositions of Homer Tell Runkle and Thomas

A. Paluso.)
2.

Standard practice in the industry called for the

using of front-end loaders of a size and height that would
result in the material loaded being dropped only a distance of
approximately 10 feet before hitting the bed of the trailer.
The Contractor, however, in order to speed up the loading
procedure, used much larger front-end loaders than would
ordinarily be used in the industry, thus dropping the material
as much as 13-1/2 feet.

This extra drop, combined with the

unexpected heavy and large chunks of material being loaded,
resulted in extraordinary damage to the Truck Owner's
equipment.

(See deposition of Homer Tell Runkle and Thomas A.

Paluso).
3.

Notwithstanding the requirement of the equipment

leasing agreement that the roads over which the leased
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equipment was to be operated were to be maintained by the
Contractor in a suitable condition "so that unreasonable or
excessive wear and tear to the leased units shall not result
from the operation," the Contractor failed to so maintain the
roads and dragged the trailers over excessively rough roads and
over large material already dumped/ with the result that the
undercarriage of the trucks and trailers was excessively
damaged and in many cases the undertrailer control mechanism
entirely torn away.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is the position of appellants that the court
erroneously applied the law to factual situations in the case
as follows:
1.

The court held that while the Contractor may be

responsible to the Truck Owner for extraordinary wear and tear
to the equipment/ the Surety was not.

The court seemed to rely

heavily on cases cited by the Surety to the effect that claims
for negligence against the Contractor were not within the
bond.

We do not quarrel with these cases generally but feel

that the determining factor is not whether the damage occurred
through the negligence of the Contractor but whether or not the
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repairs of the damage contributed and went into the performance
of the project.

It is true that the term "negligence" is used

in the leasing agreement to characterize the type of
extraordinary damages for which the Contractor is obligated to
repair.

However, the use of that term, inadvertently or

otherwise, does not automatically disqualify claims for the
repairs from coverage by the bond.

The test is whether the

repairs contributed to and went into the performance of the
construction of the project.

We will cite cases in the body of

the argument to the effect that the use of "negligence" to
characterize such claim does not disqualify them.

Furthermore,

it should be kept in mind in this instance that these damages
were inflicted on the Truck Owner's property in order to avoid
other costs i.e., screening, slower loading, grading on
approach roads which would be in the coverage of the bond if
they had been performed as agreed.

In other words, the

Contractor attempted to cut costs by shifting part of such
costs to the Truck Owner's equipment.

It is, therefore, our

position that it is within the bond.
2.

The court erred in holding that the money in the

escrow became the property of the Surety because it has paid
claims to various subcontractors and materialmen on behalf of
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the Contractor, although it has paid nothing as yet to the
Truck Owner.

If the first assignment of error as above is

decided in favor of the Truck Owner, this point will become
moot as the Truck Owner will be able to recover its entire
judgment from the Surety and will not need the escrow fund as a
source of satisfying a judgment against the Contractor.
However, if the Surety is not liable for the repair bill, then
the Contractor should be able to apply the escrow funds on that
bill and proceed against the Surety on its summary judgment on
the bills for rental.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CLAIMS FOR
REPAIRS TO THE TRUCK OWNER'S EQUIPMENT ARE NOT
COVERED BY THE PAYMENT BOND.

The Surety argued in the court below that although the
Contractor may be liable to the Truck Owner for the
extraordinary damages, as such claims arise from breach of
contract or negligence, they are not covered by the bond.

The

cases cited by the Surety in the court below, however, did not
go to the basic point, that being whether or not the repairs
for which the Truck Owner is seeking to be paid actually may be
considered as going into the project.
We agree that a claim arising under a construction
contract or due to a contractor's negligence may be good
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against the contractor and not good against the Surety, even
though it arises out of the construction contract or even
though the negligence is incident to the performance of the
contract«

However, we do not agree, as the Surety asserted and

the court below held, that damages are automatically excluded
from the coverage of the bond iust because they arise "as a
result of breach of contract" or iust because they are "due to
the negligence of the Contractor."

The test is whether the

recovery being sought is for items that went into and became
part of the project.

If so, they are recoverable.

If not,

they are not recoverable.
This court has already held, in accord with the great
weight of authority in this country, that repairs to equipment
performing the work may be considered as going into the project
and thus recoverable from a surety.
Company, 293 P. 611.

Tolton v. Maryland

The court below acknowledged this but

held that as a matter of law, as the Truck Owner was
responsible for ordinary wear, tear, and depreciation, and as
the claims here being disputed were for extraordinary wear and
tear resulting from the negligence of the Contractor, as a
matter of law, no claim for repairs could be recovered under
the bond.

It should be kept in mind that was on a motion for

summary judgment where all disputes of fact and all inferences
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from disputed fact should be resolved in favor of the Truck
Owner.
The Surety below cited no case comparable to the set
of facts in this case.

The Truck Owner, the appellant here,

relied principally upon a case which appears to be directly in
point.

That case is Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino

Construction Co., 363 F.2d 108.

The facts are strikingly

similar to the case now before this court.

It is true that

this case was interpreting the federal Miller Act.

However,

the Miller Act is in all respects similar to our state
statute.

It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who has furnished labor or
material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in such contract, in respect of
which a payment bond is furnished . . .
shall have the right to sue on such payment
bond . . . .
(40 U.S.C. 270b)
The contractual provision in the Moran case is

strikingly similar to the contractual language in this case as
quoted above, even to the extent of using the term "negligence"
to describe the extraordinary damages to the equipment which
was held to be within the bond.

In the Moran case, the

contractual provision read as follows:
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We [Moran] shall be responsible for all
ordinary wear and tear to our vessel
equipment due to the nature of the material
to be transported but you [Gammino] shall be
responsible for any damage to our vessel
equipment due to your negligence, or for any
damage to our vessel equipment whether or
not due to your negligence that may be
occasioned by loading or unloading of pieces
weighing in excess of 1000 lbs. per piece.*
In Moran the equipment in question, in addition to
ordinary wear and tear, was damaged from a number of other
factors which the court held were caused by the negligence of
the lessee, Gammino.

In fact, part of the damage was caused by

actions almost identical with those now before this court.

The

scows in the Moran case, which have a lot of similarity to the
belly dump trailers in this case, were badly damaged as a
result of dumping large rock into them.

Testimony in the Moran

case was that custom in the industry called for lining the
body; in other words, gently lowering the first layer of stone
to cushion the fall of the others.

In our case, testimony

would be (see deposition of Thomas Tell Runkle) that custom
would call for screening the material and for using a much
smaller front-end loader than was actually used.

*The contractual language is not quoted in the
appellate court opinion. The above quote is taken from the
reported opinion of the district court. Reported at 204
F. Supp. 353.
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The appellate court in Moran held that such damage was
covered, the conclusion of the court being stated as follows:
The present case stands in much the same
posture. It is perhaps not an undue
exaggeration to describe the Moran scows as
having been "consumed" in the course of
Gammino's use of them. Moreover, Gammino's
acceptance of the obligation to pay for any
excess wear and tear regardless of fault can
properly be seen more as a form of
compensation for their use than as a kind of
insurance coverage.
A CONTRACT OF A SURETY IS STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST SURETY.
In Tolton, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated the
rule:
Our own court is committed to the rule that
the contract of a surety, for hire, is to be
strictly construed against the surety.
This rule is the same as that followed by federal
courts in applying the Miller Act which is being applied in the
Moran case discussed above.

In the case of United States v.

Kelly, 192 F. Supp. 274 (Ark. 1961), the court stated:
The reasoning of these cases is that the
Miller Act is remedial in nature and is
entitled to liberal construction to effect
legislative intent to protect those whose
labors and material go into public projects.

-15-

A SURETY IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE WHEN DAMAGES
CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE MAKE UP PART OF THE RENT,
The cases cited by Reliance and the arguments of Reliance
do not apply to the immediate case.

Reliance argues that the

surety is not generally liable for negligence*
proposition is true.

This general

However, plaintiffs have included in their

agreement with LAYS that LAYS will pay plaintiffs for all damages
due to their misuse of plaintiffs' equipment.

Plaintiffs knew

that the equipment would be used for the hauling of a coarse slag
material and provided for extra compensation in the event its
equipment was damaged.

Therefore, Reliance's liability does not

arise from a general theory of negligence, but arises from the
contract price or rental charged by plaintiffs for its providing
"labor or materials".
Certainly, on a motion for summary judgment based upon
the pleadings and the facts as set forth in the depositions of the
Truck Owners' witnesses, the Truck Owners, as the claimant and as
the resistor of the motion for summary judgment, was entitled to
the presumption that the extraordinary repairs went into and
became part of the project.
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II.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ESCROW FUNDS BELONGED TO THE SURETY BY
RIGHT OF SUBROGATION.

The escrow account was created by the Contractor and
the Truck Owner.

Neither the State nor the Surety were parties

to that agreement and probably neither of them knew of the
existence of the escrow until this litigation began.

The

monies that went into the escrow account arose from disputed
billings as between Contractor and the Truck Owner.

While the

items in dispute which gave rise to the placing of the monies
in the escrow account can be identified by checking back, the
escrow account itself is a single account and does not
segregate funds therein based upon what type of disputed
billings gave rise to the deposit.

The escrow account provides

that it shall be disbursed by the escrow agent only on joint
order of the Contractor and the Truck Owner or by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction.
The court order does not identify as to whose rights
the Surety became subrogated.

Certainly, the Surety could gain

no greater right to the funds than was possessed by the person
to whose right they became subrogated.

The basis of the right

to subrogation is set forth concisely in the case of Pearlman
v. Reliance Insurance Company, 371 U.S. 132 9 L. Ed. 2d 190 at
page 193 as follows:
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And probably there are few doctrine better
established than that a surety who pays the
debt of another is entitled to all the
rights of a person he paid to enforce his
right to be reimbursed.
The surety becomes subrogated to the rights of any three
classes of claimants:

(1) the contractor; (2) the owner of the

project; or (3) persons supplying labor and materials on the
project.

This doctrine is set forth rather concisely in the

case of Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) as follows:
. . . But the surety in cases like this
undertakes duties which entitled it to step
into three sets of shoes. When, on default
of the contractor, it pays all the bills of
the job to date and completes the job, it
stands in the shoes of the contractor
insofar as there are receivables due it; in
the shoes of laborers and materialmen who
have been paid by the surety—who may have
had liens; and, not least, in the shoes of
the government, for whom the job was
completed.
As stated above, the court did not state to whose
rights the Surety became subrogated.

Certainly, not to the

rights of the government as the government had paid the money
and under no circumstances had any right to recover it; not to
the rights of other lien claimants, as they would have no right
to the escrowed monies as against the Truck Owner; and not to
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the rights of the Contractor because a determination has not
yet been made as to whether the Contractor is entitled to any
of the money back.
Whether or not the Surety is entitled to proceed
against the escrowed funds for the amount of the summary
judgment against the Surety to the amount of such summary
judgment is dealt with later in this section.

However, the

court held that the Surety was entitled not only to recover
from the escrow the amount it might at some future time have to
pay to the Truck Owner on behalf of the Contractor but the
court held it was entitled to the entire amount of the escrow
by right of subrogation but fails to say subrogated to what
rights or to whose rights.
PLAINTIFFS NEED NOT RESORT TO THE ESCROW PRIOR TO
SEEKING PAYMENT FROM RELIANCE.
Plaintiffs need not resort to the escrow fund prior to
seeking payment from Reliance.

The rule is stated in 72 C.J.S.

Principal and Surety 334 and cases cited therein::
Except where the suretyship contract
provides otherwise, at common law a creditor
ordinarily cannot be required, before
proceeding against the surety, to resort to
and exhaust collateral security held by him
for payment of the indebtedness, or to
proceed against other property of the
principal which is subject to the

-19-

satisfaction of the debt, or to avail
himself of other means of enforcement; nor
can he be compelled to realize first on any
particular one of several securities.
The text goes on to say:
If the creditor or obligee has received
collateral security from the principal,
without any stipulation that it is to be
held for any particular debt, or holds any
property of the principal, the creditor or
obligee can apply it to debts for which the
surety is not liable.
Restatement of Security Page 355 131 provides:
. . . a creditor who has a security interest
in property of the principal may compel
performance by the surety before resorting
to the security interest.
It is to the contractor's rights, if any, that the
surety has become subrogated.

The contractor has no right to

get back any of the escrow money until its obligation to the
Truck Owner has been paid in full.

This is so even though the

Surety may have paid part of the obligation of the contractor.
A very old Utah case, Featherstone v. Emerson, 45 P. 713 (Utah
1896) is in point here.

The court stated:

. . . As a general rule the right of
subrogation cannot be enforced until the
whole debt is paid or tendered to the
creditor. Emerson should have extinguished
the debt before invoking the remedy sought.
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Until the creditor is paid, there cannot
ordinarily be any interference with his
security which might prejudice or embarrass
him in collecting the balance of his claim.
Another case involving a Utah party which has the same holding
is the case of National Surety Co. v. Salt Lake County, 5 F.2d
34 (8th Cir. 1925).

The Federal Court stated:

. . . The rule applicable to this situation
seems to be fairly well settled. That rule
is that, "The right of subrogation cannot be
enforced until the whole debt is paid. And
until the creditor be wholly satisfied,
there ought and can be no interference with
his rights or his securities, which might,
even by bare possibility, prejudice or
embarrass him in any way in the collection
of the residue of his claim.1'
So until the Truck Owner is paid in full by the contractor for
all claims under the contract which were not covered by the
Surety, the contractor would have no right to recover any of
the money out of the escrow.

As the contractor had no right,

then there was nothing to which the Surety can become
subrogated.

The Truck Owner may execute directly against the

Surety and reserve his right against the escrow fund to recover
anything not recovered from the Surety.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, it is the position of
the Truck Owners Plaintiffs below and Appellants here, that
both of Surety's Motions for Summary Judgment should have been
denied.

In order to grant those Motions, the Court below would

have had to have resolved all disputed questions of fact and
all inferences therefrom most strongly in favor of the moving
party.

Such is in the law.
Respectfully submitted,
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By
Calvin L. Rampton, Esq.
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